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Abstract: This paper provides an evidence-based evaluation of the competing ways of explaining and 
tackling the informal economy. Conventionally, participants have been viewed as rational economic 
actors who engage in the informal economy when the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus participation 
is deterred by increasing the sanctions and/or risks of detection. Recently, however, an alternative social 
actor approach has emerged viewing participation to result from a lack of vertical trust (i.e., their norms, 
values and beliefs are not in symmetry with the laws and regulations) and horizontal trust (i.e., they believe 
many others are non-compliant). Reporting 2,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in Croatia in 2015, only 
a weak and partial association is found between participation in the informal economy and the perceived 
level of penalties and risks of detection, but a strong significant association with both the level of vertical 
and horizontal trust. Those who perceive a larger proportion of the population to be engaged in the informal 
economy, and those whose norms differ to the laws and regulations, display a significantly greater likelihood 
of participating in the informal economy. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.    
Keywords: informal sector; tax morale; tax evasion; institutional theory; Croatia; South-East Europe.  
JEL Classification: H26, J46, K42, O17, P37 
1  Introduction
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the competing ways of explaining and tackling the informal economy. 
The conventional dominant explanation for participation in the informal economy has been a rational 
economic actor approach which views participants as engaging when the pay-off is greater than the 
expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). To tackle the informal economy, 
in consequence, the policy approach has been to increase the actual or perceived sanctions and risks of 
detection. 
Since the turn of the millennium, nevertheless, a social actor approach has emerged. Grounded in 
institutional theory (North, 1990), this views participation in the informal economy to arise when the 
norms, values and beliefs of citizens (i.e., the informal institutions) are not aligned with the laws and 
regulations of the formal institutions (Alm et al., 2010; Cummings et al., 2009; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; 
Torgler, 2007; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b), and thus there is a lack of what is here termed “vertical 
trust”. Its approach is thus to bring the informal institutions (i.e., the norms, values and beliefs of citizens) 
into symmetry with the codified laws and regulations of the formal institutions (Alm et al., 2012; Alm and 
Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012; Williams and Horodnic, 2016a,b). In recent years, moreover, this social actor 
approach has started to view participation in the informal economy as additionally influenced determined 
by citizens’ lack of horizontal trust that others are operating in a compliant manner (Baric, 2016; Williams 
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et al., 2017). The intention of this paper is to evaluate these competing ways of explaining and tackling 
participation in the informal economy.  
In the next section, therefore, these rational economic actor and social actor perspectives are reviewed 
in order to formulate some hypotheses for evaluation. Following this, the third section introduces the data 
and methodology to evaluate these hypotheses, namely a logit regression analysis of the data from 2,000 
face-to-face interviews undertaken in late 2015 in Croatia. The fourth section then reports the results. Finding 
only a weak and partial association between participation in the informal economy and the perceived level 
of penalties and risk of detection, but a strong significant association between participation in the informal 
economy and the level of vertical and horizontal trust, the fifth and final section concludes by discussing 
the theoretical and policy implications.  
Throughout this paper, and mirroring the consensus in the scholarly and policy literature regarding 
how the informal economy in developed countries should be defined, the informal economy here refers to 
paid work which is legal in all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social security 
and/or labour law purposes (Aliyev, 2015; Barsoum, 2015; Boels, 2014; European Commission, 2007; 
Hodosi, 2015; OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014a,b). If it is not legal in all other respects, it is not considered work 
in the informal economy. If the goods and/or services exchanged are illegal (e.g., selling illegal drugs) for 
instance, then this is not part of the informal economy work but is the wider criminal economy. If unpaid, 
meanwhile, it is part of the unpaid subsistence sphere. 
2  Competing perspectives towards the informal economy
Since the turn of the millennium, there has been widespread recognition that even if the informal economy 
is more prevalent in the developing than developed world, such endeavour is extensive and persistent in 
all global regions (ILO, 2018; Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009; Williams and Schneider, 2016; World Bank, 2019). 
Indeed, given that 60 per cent of the global workforce has their main employment in the informal economy 
(Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009), tackling the informal economy has moved near to the top of the policy agendas 
of most supra-national agencies and many governments across the globe (European Commission, 2007; 
OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014a, 2017). 
How, therefore, can undeclared work be explained and tackled? Reviewing the literature, it becomes 
quickly apparent that two distinct ways of explaining and tackling the informal economy prevail. These are 
the rational economic actor approach that views participation in the informal economy when the benefits 
outweigh the costs, and this seeks to tackle the informal economy by ensuring that payoff from informal 
work is outweighed by the costs, and the social actor approach grounded in a view that the informal 
economy results from a lack of vertical and horizontal trust. Here, each is considered in turn.
2.1  Rational economic actor perspective
This rational economic actor perspective has its origins in the classical treatises of Cesare Beccaria 
(Beccaria, 1797) and Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1788) that both propound a utilitarian approach towards 
crime. Citizens are viewed as rational actors who assess the costs and benefits confronting them, and break 
the law if the expected penalty and probability of being caught is smaller than the benefits gained. This 
rational actor view of crime was popularised in the late 1960s by Becker (1968). It was then quickly applied 
to other forms of non-compliance. In the early 1970s, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) argued that tax evasion 
occurred when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished, and that the 
goal of governments was thus to change the cost/benefit ratio facing citizens. This was to be achieved by 
increasing the actual and/or perceived penalties and risks of detection, and thus costs. This approach was 
subsequently widely adopted (e.g., Grabiner, 2000; Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Job et al., 2007; Richardson 
and Sawyer, 2001; Williams, 2017). Indeed, this is also the dominant policy approach in Croatia where the 
emphasis when tackling the informal economy is on increasing the penalties and risks of detection, so as 
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to ensure that the costs outweigh the benefits (Baric, 2016; Baric et al., 2016; Dzhekova and Williams, 2014; 
Dzhekova et al., 2014; Franic and Williams, 2014a; Williams and Franic, 2016; Williams et al, 2014, 2017).  
Despite the dominance of this approach both in Croatia as well as elsewhere, the evidence-base that 
participants in the informal economy are rational actors, and that increasing the sanctions and risks of 
detection the informal economy reduces participation, is less than conclusive (Alm et al., 1992, 1995; Slemrod 
et al., 2001; Varma and Doob, 1998). To evaluate the validity of this rational economic actor perspective, 
therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested:
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): the higher are the perceived penalties and risks of detection, the lower the 
likelihood of participation in the informal economy, ceteris paribus.
H1a: the higher are the perceived penalties, the lower the likelihood of participation in the informal economy.
H1b: the higher are the perceived risks of detection, the lower the likelihood of participation in the informal economy.
2.2  Social actor perspective
Over the past decade, there has been recognition that many citizens do not participate in the informal 
economy even when the benefit/cost ratio suggests that they should be doing so (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 
2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007). The outcome has been the emergence of a “social actor” 
approach which argues that many are compliant even when it would be rational for them to be non-
compliant because they self-regulate themselves (Alm and Torgler, 2006, 2011; Cummings et al., 2009; 
McKerchar et al., 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider, 2007).
This perspective has its roots in the work of Georg von Schanz (1890) who argued that a tax contract 
exists between the state and its citizens. Some six decades later this was further advanced by the German 
“Cologne school of tax psychology” which sought to measure this tax contract (see Schmölders, 1952, 
1960, 1962; Strümpel, 1969) and viewed the breakdown of this contract as a primary determinant of tax 
non-compliance (Schmölders, 1960). This social actor approach receded for some decades following the 
ascendancy of the rational economic actor approach from the 1970s. However, over the past decade, it has 
begun to re-emerge (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011) and its contemporary theoretical 
foundations lie in the work of Schneider and Enste (2013). The outcome of its re-emergence is that calls have 
been made to improve the trust of citizens in the state so as to solidify this tax contract since self-regulation 
will ensue (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012; Torgler and Schneider, 2007a, 2007b; Williams, 2014a; 
Williams, 2017). 
Reading this approach through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 
1990), all societies have both formal institutions (i.e., laws and regulations) that define the legal rules of 
the game, as well as informal institutions, which are the “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that 
are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004: 727). When the formal institutions (which we here term “state morale”) and informal institutions 
(here termed “civic morale”) are not aligned, the level of vertical trust of citizens in the state will be lower 
and the informal economy more prevalent (Webb et al., 2009; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, 2017). Indeed, 
the higher the level of asymmetry, the greater is the level of engagement in the informal economy (Williams 
et al. 2014). In recent years, moreover, it has been proposed that it is not just the lack of vertical trust (i.e., 
formal/informal institutional asymmetry) that leads to work in the informal economy, but also the lack of 
horizontal trust that other citizens are operating in a compliant manner (Baric, 2016; Williams et al., 2017). 
When citizens perceive that a large majority of citizens are breaking the formal rules of the game, then the 
argument is that they too decide to do so. Indeed, the lower the level of horizontal trust (i.e., the greater the 
perceived propensity of other citizens to be non-compliant), the greater will be likelihood that citizens will 
themselves act in a non-compliant manner. To evaluate the validity of this social actor approach towards 
explaining and tackling participation in the informal economy, therefore, the following hypothesis can be 
evaluated:
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Social actor hypothesis (H2): the greater the level of horizontal and vertical trust, the lower is the likelihood of participation 
in the informal economy.
H2a: the greater is the level of horizontal trust, the lower the likelihood of participation in the informal economy.
H2b: the greater the level of vertical trust, the lower the likelihood of participation in the informal economy.
3  Data and Variables
3.1  Data
To evaluate these hypotheses on explaining and tackling the informal economy, data is here reported from 
2,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in Croatia in late 2015. This survey analysed not only attitudes 
towards the informal economy, but also who purchases and supplies work in the informal economy, and 
the relationship between participation in the informal economy and the perceived penalties and risk of 
detection, and level of vertical and horizontal trust. To ensure that the data was a representative national 
sample, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was used. This ensured that with the 
regard to the variables of gender, age, region and locality size, the national level sample, as well as each 
level of the sample, was representative in proportion to its population size. In every household the “closest 
birthday” rule was applied to select respondents, while every subsequent address was determined by the 
standard “random route” procedure.  
3.2  Variables
To evaluate whether increasing the perceived penalties and risks of detection, and greater vertical and 
horizontal trust, reduces the likelihood of participation in the informal economy, the dependent variable 
used is a dummy variable with a recorded value 1 for those who answered “yes” to the question: “Did you 
yourself carry out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months? Here we mean again activities which 
you were paid for which were not or not fully reported to the tax authorities.” 
To evaluate the association between participation in the informal economy and the different approaches 
towards explaining and tackling the informal economy, four explanatory variables were used. Firstly, to 
evaluate whether the perceived risk of detection influences the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy, a categorical variable was used describing the perceived risk of being detected, with value 0 for 
a very small, value 1 for fairly small risk, value 2 for fairly high risk and value 3 for very high risk. Secondly, 
to evaluate how penalties are associated with the likelihood of participation in the informal economy, a 
categorical variable was used describing the expected sanctions, with value 0 for those asserting that the 
normal tax or social security contributions would be due, value 1 for those stating that the normal tax or 
social security contributions due, plus there would be a fine or value 3 for imprisonment. 
Third and finally, to evaluate the association between participation in the informal economy and the 
level of vertical trust, an interval variable was used by constructing an asymmetry index based on self-
reported attitudes towards the acceptability of participating in the informal economy using a 10-point 
Likert scale. This asymmetry index provides a measure of the lack of alignment of citizens’ norms, values 
and beliefs with the laws and regulations of the formal institutions, and thus a proxy measure of the degree 
of citizens’ trust in the laws and regulations. Rather than use a single question to assess this asymmetry 
index, this survey uses a range of questions by asking the following:
Now I would like to know how you would rate various actions or behaviours. For each of them, please tell me to what extent 
you find it acceptable or not. Please use the following scale: “1” means that you find it absolutely unacceptable and “10” 
means that you find it absolutely acceptable: (1) someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; (2) an individual 
is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security authorities 
even though it should be declared; (3) A firm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the payment received 
to the tax or social security authorities; (4) a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to 
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the tax or social security authorities; (5) a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her are not 
officially declared and (6) someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income.
Collating the responses to these six questions, and giving equal weighting to each response, an aggregate 
“asymmetry index” is constructed for each individual. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of the scale is 
0.87 which shows a good internal consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000). The index is represented here in 
the 10-point Likert scale original format. The lower the index value, the higher is the trust in the formal 
institutions (i.e., the more aligned are citizens’ norms and values with the codified laws and regulations).
Fourth and finally, to evaluate the association between participation in the informal economy and 
the level of horizontal trust, a categorical variable was used of the citizens’ estimated proportion of the 
population engaged in the informal economy with value 0 for less than 5 per cent, value 1 for 5 to 10 per 
cent, value 2 for 10 to 20 per cent, value 3 for 20-50 per cent, and value 5 for over 50 per cent.
Drawing upon previous studies evaluating participation in the informal economy in terms of the 
important socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables influencing the likelihood of 
engagement (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b, 2016a,b; Williams and Padmore, 2013a,b), the control 
variables selected are: 
 – Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for women and 1 for men.
 – Age: an interval variable indicating the exact age of the respondent.
 – Employment status: a categorical variable with value 0 for employed, value 1 for self-employed, value 
2 for retired, value 3 for unemployed, and value 4 for the inactive population (students, disabled, etc).
 – Financial situation: a categorical variable with value 0 for no money problems, value 1 for just 
comfortable, value 2 for maintaining, and value 3 for struggling. 
 – Type of locality: a categorical variable with value 0 for rural area or village, value 1 for small or middle-
sized town, value 2 for large urban area. 
 – Regions: a categorical variable with value 0 for North Croatia, value 1 for Slavonia, value 2 for Lika and 
Banovina, value 3 for Istria, Primorje and Gorski Gotar, value 4 for Dalmatia and value 5 for Zagreb and 
the surrounding region.
Given that there were a considerable number of missing values and inconclusive answers (i.e., refusal and 
“don’t know”) across the dependent, explanatory and independent variables, multiple imputation was 
used to predict the values. This is done using a system of chained equations for each variable with missing 
values, with 25 imputations simulated for each missing value. Furthermore, population weights are applied 
based on age and gender to correct for under- and over-representation in the sample. 
To evaluate the relationship between participation in the informal economy and the perceived penalties 
and risk of detection, and the level of vertical and horizontal trust, a logit regression analysis is here 
conducted. Before analysing the findings, and given the sensitive topic being investigated, the reliability 
of the data collected in the survey needs to be briefly discussed. In 93% of the interviews, the interviewers 
reported good or excellent cooperation from the participant when answering the questions, and average 
cooperation in 6% of cases. Cooperation was found to be poor in only 1% of cases. No evidence was thus 
identified of reticence on the part of respondents in answering the questions, perhaps reflecting how the 
informal economy, although formally illegal is widely deemed a socially legitimate endeavour in Croatia. 
Below, therefore, the results are reported.
4  Findings
Of the 2,000 respondents interviewed in late 2015 in Croatia, 9.2 per cent reported participating in the 
informal economy in the last 12 months, which is just under 1 in 11. Examining the type of activities in which 
they had engaged, 21 per cent of these undeclared workers had provided home repair and maintenance 
services, 10 per cent car repairs, 10 per cent had engaged in domestic cleaning, 9 per cent had sold goods 
or services associated with their hobby, 9 per cent had sold food produce, 9 per cent tutoring, 8 per cent 
IT assistance, 7 per cent gardening services, 7 per cent had worked as a waiter or waitress, 6 per cent 
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baby-sitting, and 4 per cent had undertaken home removal. A further 35 per cent of respondents reported 
participating in other activities, displaying the multifarious activities in which participants engage on an 
informal basis.   
Only 13 per cent of this work in the informal economy was conducted as waged employment for 
businesses. The vast bulk (81 per cent) of work in the informal economy was conducted on a self-employed 
basis, with 51 per cent conducted for friends, colleagues or acquaintances, 2 per cent for relatives, 6 per cent 
for neighbours, and the remaining 22 per cent on a self-employed basis for people previously unknown to 
them. Some 6 per cent either refused to answer, or did not know. The important finding, therefore, is that 
the majority (59 per cent) of all informal work in Croatia is conducted for close social relations. This is a 
similar proportion to the finding in previous studies in the EU28 as a whole (Williams, 2014). 
Which population groups, therefore, are more likely to participate in the informal economy? And is 
participation in the informal economy associated with respondents’ perceptions of the level of penalties 
and risks of detection, as well as their perceptions of the propensity of others to participate in the informal 
economy (i.e., their level of horizontal trust) and whether their norms, values and beliefs are in symmetry 
with the laws and regulations (i.e., their level of vertical trust)? 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, this reveals that men 
are more likely to participate in the informal economy than women (12.9 per cent compared with 5.9 per cent), as 
are younger age groups markedly more likely to do so, and those who are single or cohabiting, and those living in 
larger households. These reflect previous findings in the wider European Union (Williams and Horodnic, 2017). 
Turning to socio-economic characteristics, it is also the case that the unemployed are particularly more likely to 
participate in the informal economy. There is also what appears to be a U-shaped curve regarding participation 
with regard to both their financial situation and net income from formal employment. Those at the two ends 
of these continua are more likely to participate in the informal economy than those in the middle. That is both 
those struggling financially as well as those with no money problems display a greater propensity to participate 
in the informal economy, as do those with no income from formal employment and those with higher formal 
incomes, which is similar to the situation in other transition economies (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 
2011). Examining the spatial variations, participation in the informal economy appears to be more prevalent in 
rural areas and villages than in more urban areas, and more prevalent in some regions (i.e., Slavonia and Istria, 
Primorje and Gorski Kotar, and North Croatia) than the rest of the country.   
Investigating the association between participation in the informal economy and the perceptions of the 
risk of detection, no discernible trend is apparent, and so far as sanctions are concerned, there appears to 
be a slightly greater likelihood that those who perceive the sanctions as lower are more likely to participate 
in the informal economy. There does, however, appear to be clear relationship between participation in the 
informal economy and the level of trust. On the one hand, those who perceive the rest of the population to 
be more likely to participate in the informal economy are themselves more likely to do so, reflecting that 
where “horizontal trust” is low (i.e., trust in other citizens to operate legitimately), participation in the 
informal economy is more likely. On the other hand, there also appears to be a close association between 
participation in the informal economy and a lack of vertical trust (i.e., the degree to which the norms, 
values and beliefs of citizens are not in symmetry with the laws and regulations). The lower is the alignment 
between citizen morale and state morale, the higher is the propensity to participate in the informal economy. 
To evaluate whether there is a statistically significant association between participation in the informal 
economy and these explanatory variables when the control variables are introduced and held constant, as 
well as whether any of these control variables are significantly associated with participation in the informal 
economy, Table 2 reports the results of a logit regression analysis. Marital status, household size and net 
income were omitted due to multicollinearity issues. Starting with the control variables and thus which 
groups should be perhaps targeted by inspectors seeking to tackle participation in undeclared work, the 
results reveal that women are significantly less likely than men to participate in the informal economy, but 
that age is not significantly associated with the likelihood of engaging in such work. A plausible reason 
is that other characteristics affect the propensity to participate in the informal economy which in turn is 
dependent on age, such as the level of vertical trust. Employment status, however, is significantly associated 
with participation in the informal economy. Unemployed and self-employed individuals are significantly 
8QDXWKHQWLFDWHG
'RZQORDG'DWH_$0
 Explaining and tackling the informal economy: an evaluation of competing perspectives   69
more likely to participate in the informal economy. The propensity to participate in the informal economy, 
however, is not conditional upon their self-assessed financial position. There is, however, a significant 
association with the type of community inhabited. Those living in a rural area or village are significantly 
more likely to participate in the informal economy than those in more urban areas, but there is no significant 
correlation between participation and the region one inhabits. These results largely confirm many previous 
studies on undeclared work in both South-East European and the European Union (Williams and Franic, 
2016; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,c, 2016b,c; Williams and Kayaoglu, 2017; Williams et al., 2014).
Table 1 Participation in informal economy in Croatia: % of surveyed individuals
Yes No Refusal DK
Gender Male 12.9 84.4 2.3 0.4
Female 5.8 92.5 0.8 0.9
Age 15 - 24 14.0 84.2 0.7 1.1
25 - 34 10.9 85.9 2.5 0.7
35 - 44 10.9 85.7 2.5 0.9
45 - 54 11.7 86.8 1.5 0.0
55 - 64 6.5 91.8 1.1 0.6
65+ 3.1 95.0 1.2 0.7
Marital status (Re)Married 7.2 90.5 1.8 0.5
Cohabiting 19.6 75.7 4.0 0.7
Single 11.5 86.7 1.0 0.8
Divorced 8.4 90.5 0.0 1.1
Widowed 4.2 95.0 0.0 0.8
Household size One 8.3 90.2 0.8 0.7
Two 6.0 91.9 1.7 0.4
Three 10.2 87.7 1.8 0.3
Four or more 11.8 85.4 1.7 1.1
Occupation Dependent employee 8.6 88.3 2.4 0.7
Self-employed 11.3 87.5 1.2 0.0
Unemployed 17.8 80.3 1.4 0.5
Retired 4.6 93.9 0.9 0.6
Inactive (students. disabled. etc.) 10.9 87.3 0.8 1.0
Financial situation Struggling 11.1 87.1 1.1 0.7
Maintaining 7.7 90.0 1.6 0.7
Just comfortable 8.3 89.1 2.1 0.5
No money problems 14.4 81.4 4.2 0.0
Net income from 
formal work
0 14.1 84.8 0.8 0.3
1-2,500 9.5 89.5 0.6 0.4
2,501-5,000 7.7 90.1 1.4 0.8
5,001-7,500 8.1 90.8 1.1 0.0
7,501-10,000 4.0 96.0 0.0 0.0
10,001-15,000 15.2 84.8 0.0 0.0
More than 15,000 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Type of community Rural area or village 10.6 87.3 1.4 0.7
Small or middle sized town 9.1 88.0 2.1 0.8
Large town 7.0 91.6 1.0 0.4
Region Zagreb 7.5 90.6 1.0 0.9
North Croatia 10.2 88.0 0.9 0.9
Slavonia 12.8 86.4 0.8 0.0
Lika and Banovina 6.0 91.6 1.4 1.0
Istria. Primorje and Gorski Kotar 12.2 85.0 2.8 0.0
Dalmatia 6.9 89.6 2.7 0.8
Perceived detection 
risk
Very small 9.6 88.1 1.6 0.7
Fairly small 9.7 88.5 1.5 0.3
Fairly high 7.3 90.6 1.1 1.0
Very high 10.6 88.8 0.0 0.6
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Yes No Refusal DK
Expected sanctions Tax + contributions 10.1 88.1 1.6 0.2
Tax + contributions + fine 8.1 90.4 1.2 0.3
Prison 6.4 91.9 0.0 1.7
Estimated share of 
population engaged 
in  informal 
economy
Less than 5% 1.9 95.1 3.0 0.0
5 to 10% 4.5 93.9 0.6 1.0
10 to 20% 7.3 91.0 1.2 0.5
20 to 50% 11.3 86.9 1.4 0.4
50% or more 14.7 81.1 3.9 0.3
Vertical asymmetry 
index
<2 7.2 91.3 1.0 0.5
2-4 11.4 85.6 2.1 0.9
4-6 15.8 78.7 4.7 0.8
6-8 16.8 81.0 2.2 0.0
8-10 14.1 85.9 0.0 0.0
Total  9.2 88.6 1.6 0.6
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in Croatia
Table 2. Logit model of propensity to participate in the informal economy in Croatia
β
1
Standard error
Female -1.070*** 0.192
Age -0.014 0.008
Occupation (RC: Unemployed)
Dependent employee -0.637* 0.248
Self-employed -0.644 0.503
Retired -1.164** 0.361
Inactive (students, disabled, etc.) -0.660* 0.326
Financial situation (RC: Struggling)
Maintaining -0.272 0.221
Just comfortable -0.373 0.261
No money problems 0.661 0.724
Estimated share of population engaged in UW  (RC: More than 50%)
Less than 5% -3.055** 1.107
5 to 10% -1.647*** 0.465
10 to 20% -0.873** 0.315
20 to 50% -0.425 0.240
Perceived detection risk (RC: Very small)
Fairly small -0.264 0.232
Fairly high -0.591* 0.287
Very high -0.163 0.327
Expected sanctions (RC: Tax + social security contributions due)
Tax + contributions + fine -0.456* 0.217
Prison -1.197 0.626
Tax morale 0.193*** 0.045
Type of community (RC: Rural area or village)
Small or middle sized town -0.427 0.222
Large town -0.784** 0.286
Region (RC: Zagreb and surroundings)
North Croatia -0.139 0.329
Slavonia 0.074 0.315
Lika and Banovina -0.719 0.485
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar 0.103 0.316
Dalmatia -0.477 0.318
Const 0.623 0.510
Number of observations 2,000
Number of imputations 25
Prob > F 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.154
Area under ROC 0.780
Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in Croatia 8QDXWKHQWLFDWHG
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Turning to the explanatory variables, the logit model confirms that there is only a weak significant 
relationship between participation in the informal economy and the level of penalties. Those perceiving the 
penalty as being that one will have to pay the due plus a fine, are significantly less likely to participate in 
the informal economy than those who believe that the penalty is that one will have to pay the normal tax 
and social contributions owed. Those perceiving the sanction to be a prison, however, are not significantly 
less likely to engage in the informal economy than those who believe that the penalty is that one will have 
to pay the normal tax and social contributions owed. This, therefore, only partially and weakly confirms 
H1a. Turning to whether there is an association between participation in the informal economy and the 
perceived risk of detection, the finding is again that there is a weak statistically significant relationship. 
Those who perceive the risk of detection as “fairly high” are significantly less likely to participate in the 
informal economy than those who perceived the risk of detection as “very small”. However, there is no 
statistically significant difference in participation in the informal economy and those perceiving the risk 
as “fairly small” or “very high” and those perceiving the risk as “very small”. This, therefore, again only 
partially and weakly confirms H1b.  
Examining the social actor perspective, however, a strong significant relationship is identified between 
participation in the informal economy and not only the extent of horizontal trust but also the degree of 
vertical trust. There is a strong significant difference between the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy of those who perceive more than 50 per cent of the population and those who perceive small 
proportions to participate in the informal economy. Those perceiving more than 50 per cent to engage in 
the informal economy are significantly more likely to participate in the informal economy themselves than 
those who perceived less than 5 per cent to do so, those who perceive 5-10 per cent to do so, and those 
who perceived 10-20 per cent to do so. Horizontal trust, therefore, plays a strong and significant role in 
determining participation in the informal economy, strongly confirming H2a. 
It is also the case that there is strong significant relationship between the level of vertical trust and 
participation in the informal economy. The greater is the degree of asymmetry between citizens’ norms, 
values and beliefs regarding the acceptability of working in the informal economy, and the laws and 
regulations, the greater is the likelihood of participating in the informal economy. This, therefore, strongly 
confirms H2b. 
5  Discussion and Conclusions
This survey has evaluated the effectiveness of the conventional rational economic actor approach which 
explains participation in the informal economy in terms of the benefits outweighing the costs and this 
seeks to tackle the informal economy by increasing the perceived penalties and risks of detection, and the 
social actor approach which explains the informal economy in terms of the level of vertical and horizontal 
trust and tackles it by improving these. The finding is that this study of Croatia only partially and weakly 
confirms H1 that the likelihood of participation in the informal economy is influenced by the penalties and 
risks of detection, but finds a strong significant relationship between the likelihood of participation in the 
informal economy and the level of horizontal and vertical trust, thus confirming H2.
The theoretical advance made in this paper, therefore, is that it reveals the need, at a minimum, for 
the rational economic actor explanation to be supplemented by a social actor explanation that views 
participation in the informal economy to result from a low level of vertical and horizontal trust. Viewed 
through the lens of institutional theory, in consequence, when the norms, values and beliefs of citizens do 
not adhere to those of the state in terms of the codified laws and regulations, there is a greater likelihood of 
them participating in the informal economy. Importantly, moreover, this paper reveals for the first time that 
it is not just the level of vertical trust that is important, but also the degree of horizontal trust. When citizens 
perceive that a larger proportion of the population are engaged in the informal economy, they are strongly 
and significantly more likely to participate in the informal economy. In future research, therefore, there is a 
need to evaluate not only the level of vertical trust, as has been the case in the tax morale literature (Alm et 
al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011), but also the level of horizontal trust so as to evaluate whether 
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this is also so strongly significant elsewhere.    
Turning to the policy implications, the finding of this study is that even if increasing the perceived or 
actual level of penalties and risk of detection confronting citizens has a partial if weak association with the 
likelihood of engaging in the informal economy, the currently widely used deterrence approach needs at 
a very minimum to be complemented by a social actor policy approach that seeks to improve the level of 
horizontal and vertical trust. What policy measures are therefore required in order to achieve this? 
On the one hand, policy measures are required to alter the norms, values and beliefs regarding not only 
the extensiveness of the informal economy so as to improve horizontal trust, but also the acceptability of 
participation in order to reduce the asymmetry between citizens’ beliefs and the laws and regulations, and 
thus vertical trust. This requires marketing and education campaigns to raise awareness about both the 
limited extent of participation as well as the benefits of formality and costs of operating in the informal 
economy. For example, if the media publicise the notion that the informal economy is an extensive 
phenomenon, then this is likely to further reduce the level of horizontal trust, and lead to a further growth 
in the informal economy. Media publicity, therefore, needs to avoid exaggerated claims about the scale of 
the informal economy so as to garner attention because this may unintentionally cause the further growth 
of this sphere. There is also a need to design campaigns to educate citizens about the benefits of formality, 
including the benefits of taxation in terms of the public goods and services received for taxes paid, and 
costs of informality. This will help create greater adherence to the laws and regulations of the formal 
institutions and reduce the non-alignment of citizens’ norms, values and beliefs. Such measures might 
include introducing into school education, such as the civics curriculum, the issue of working formally and 
the benefits of paying taxes owed, through to sending letters to taxpayers about how their taxes are being 
spent, to putting up signs in schools, hospitals and roads for instance, stating “paid for by your taxes”.  
On the other hand, changes are also needed in the formal institutions, especially in a country such as 
Croatia where formal institutional deficiencies result in a lack of trust in government (Williams et al., 2017). 
This requires changes in both the processes and products of formal institutions. Firstly, and to tackle the 
lack of vertical trust, the process of formal institutions need modernising so as to improve the quality of 
governance. This includes pursuing improvements in the view of citizens that: the state authorities treat 
them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Murphy, 2005); they pay their fair share compared 
with others (Molero and Pujol, 2012), and they receive the goods and services they deserve for the taxes they 
pay (McGee, 2005). Secondly, however, changes in the products of formal institutions are also required, by 
which is here meant the policy initiatives to tackle macro-level economic and social conditions. As previous 
empirical studies elsewhere reveal, this includes policy initiatives to increase the level of expenditure on 
active labour market policies to support vulnerable groups, and the level of expenditure on social protection 
(Autio and Fu, 2015; Horodnic, 2016; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams and Horodnic, 20156a,b; Williams 
and Kayaoglu, 2017), both of which are strongly associated with participation in the informal economy 
since these policy measures reduce the need for marginalised citizens to operate in the informal economy 
as a survival strategy.
These findings about the need for greater emphasis on a social actor approach when explaining and 
tackling participation in the informal economy, however, are based on one dataset in one country and 
thus must remain very tentative. Further evaluations in other countries of these competing perspectives are 
required. If this paper stimulates such evaluations in a broader array of countries of these rival approaches 
towards explaining and tackling the informal economy, then it will have fulfilled one of its intentions. If 
this then encourages governments to consider alternative policy approaches other than simply deterring 
engagement in the informal economy by increasing the penalties and risks of detection, then it will have 
fulfilled its wider intention. 
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